The Florida Air Flight 90 Crash of January 13, 1982: A Tragedy of Human Error and Systemic Issues

The Florida Air Flight 90 Crash of January 13, 1982: A Tragedy of Human Error and Systemic IssuesOn January 13, 1982, Florida Air Flight 90 (QH90) suffered a devastating tragedy shortly after takeoff from Washington National Airport. The Boeing 737, en route to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with a scheduled stop at Tampa International Airport, tragically collided with the 14th Street Bridge and plunged into the icy Potomac River

The Florida Air Flight 90 Crash of January 13, 1982: A Tragedy of Human Error and Systemic Issues

On January 13, 1982, Florida Air Flight 90 (QH90) suffered a devastating tragedy shortly after takeoff from Washington National Airport. The Boeing 737, en route to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport with a scheduled stop at Tampa International Airport, tragically collided with the 14th Street Bridge and plunged into the icy Potomac River. Occurring during the golden age of television news, this became the first major airline disaster in US history to be broadcast live, leaving an indelible mark on the American psyche with its horrifying visuals and immense loss of life.

Rescue efforts were immediately launched, but the frigid weather and swift currents of the river presented significant challenges. The crash resulted in 78 fatalities 74 passengers and 4 ground personnel with only 5 crew members and one passenger miraculously surviving. This loss of life inflicted irreparable wounds on countless families and the nation as a whole.

Subsequent investigations revealed a heartbreaking truth: the disaster stemmed not from inclement weather, but from human error. Severe pilot misjudgments and a lack of experience in handling icy conditions proved catastrophic. The tragedy exposed widespread systemic issues within the airline industry, reflecting deeper societal and economic problems.

Florida Air, founded in 1971, was a low-cost carrier that experienced rapid growth following airline deregulation, becoming the 16th largest airline in the US. However, this expansion masked significant safety hazards. Shareholders relentless pursuit of profit resulted in comparatively low pilot salaries, leading to a high turnover of experienced pilots and compromising flight safety a critical factor contributing to the Flight 90 disaster.

The aircraft involved, a Boeing 737-222 (N62AF), was 12.9 years old, with 27,000 flight hours, powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9A engines. Captain Larry M. Wheaton (34), a Florida Air First Officer since October 1978 and Captain since August 1980, had approximately 8,300 flight hours, with 1,752 hours on the Boeing 737. First Officer Roger A. Pettit (31), with 3,353 flight hours, had served in the US Air Force from October 1977 to October 1980. Critically, both pilots possessed limited experience with jet aircraft, particularly in icy conditions. Their flight training primarily took place in the warmer climates of the southern US; Wheaton had only 8 icy takeoff and landing experiences, while Pettit had only 2.

On January 13, 1982, Washington National Airport experienced a blizzard, with 16.5 centimeters of snow accumulation, forcing the airport to close. After a midday lull, the airport reopened under marginal conditions. Flight 90, scheduled for an afternoon return to Florida, carried 79 people: 74 passengers and 5 crew.

Wing icing posed a significant threat. Florida Air outsourced de-icing to American Airlines. Ground crew used a heated solution of water and ethylene glycol, but failed to follow procedures mandating the covering of pitot tubes and engine air intakes to prevent liquid ingress and damage.

With the airport temperature around -4C and continued snowfall causing rapid snow accumulation, a photo taken by a passenger on another aircraft showed N62AF covered in several centimeters of snow. At 3:25 PM, the tug struggled to move the 46-ton aircraft due to the snow. Captain Wheaton decided to use engine reverse thrust to assist, melting some snow into slush, but the problem remained, requiring a tug with chains to finally move the plane.

The pilots rushed through the pre-flight checklist, overlooking some items related to the engine anti-ice system, crucial in winter conditions to prevent sensor blockage. However, due to their familiarization with Florida's warmer climate, they reflexively left the anti-ice system offa fatal oversight.

Significant delays resulted from the snow, delaying Flight 90 by about 1 hour and 45 minutes. Nearly 50 minutes had passed since de-icing. Returning for re-de-icing would cause further delays. Wheaton pursued a risky tacticpositioning the wing near the exhaust of a parked New York Air DC-9 to use its 300C, 300 km/h hot exhaust to melt the ice.

First Officer Pettit noticed that while the throttle levers were in the same position, the engine pressure ratios (EPR) differed. EPR, the ratio of compressor outlet to inlet pressure, is proportional to thrust. They discussed the left/right engine discrepancy; after two minutes, EPR values equalized. Pettit attributed this to the DC-9's exhaust affecting the right engine, causing a high reading on the inlet pressure sensor. In reality, the snow melted earlier by reverse thrust had refrozen onto the engine due to the deactivated anti-ice system, again icing the pressure sensor and causing the erroneous reading. Standard operating procedure called for greater distance from other aircraft during snowy taxiing as melted snow refreezes into solid ice, unlike snow which usually falls off with increasing speed, further highlighting the pilots' lack of winter flying experience.

At 3:58 PM, Flight 90 was cleared for takeoff. Pettit controlled the aircraft while Wheaton monitored instruments. The aircraft used 1600 meters of runway to reach rotation speed (it normally required 1068 meters). Upon rotation, Pettit found the speed far higher than expected and the aircraft in an unstable high-angle-of-attack attitude; the airframe was shaking and the stall warning horn activated. The high angle of attack and stall warning after lift-off were attributed to wing icing. The 737's swept wing design causes a forward shift in the center of lift, which can cause a sudden pitch-up during takeoff if it's sufficiently ahead of the center of gravity.

Post-takeoff, the aircraft was in crisis; its airspeed was too low, its pitch angle too steep, and its engine thrust insufficient for sustained climb. The aircraft only became airborne due to ground effect, which disappeared as the aircraft climbed. Pettit lowered the nose, but this did not improve the situation. After 31 seconds, the aircraft began its descent toward the river; increased throttle was ineffective. It struck the 14th Street Bridge and crashed into the Potomac.

The impact shattered the ice. Icy water flooded the cabin; survivors initiated self-rescue efforts. Rescue efforts were swift, but hampered by severe conditions; the impact with the bridge killed four people on the bridge and critically injured four more.

Hours after the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) launched an investigation. The crash site was less than 2 kilometers from the runway, indicating an accident during the climb. A week later, the "black boxes" were recovered. The flight data recorder (FDR) showed a 45-second takeoff (15 seconds longer than normal) and problems with the power plant; the aircraft had reached rotation speed but lacked the climb capability.

During runway acceleration, Pettit informed Wheaton of the abnormal aircraft status, but Wheaton deemed it not a problem. In 1982, only the captain could decide to abort takeoff. Takeoff power settings should consider aircraft weight, runway length, and temperature. Possibly, Pettit had set the power too low; the aircraft was not overweight. Due to limited FDR data, investigators attempted to infer power settings from engine sounds, estimating engine output at only about 70% power.

Investigation (The provided text ends abruptly here. The investigation details could be added here.)

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